Existing equilibrium concepts for games make use of the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by S a v age (1954) to represent players' preferences. Accordingly, each player's beliefs about the strategies played by opponents are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by the Ellsberg Paradox and relevant experimental ndings demonstrating that the beliefs of a decision maker may not be representable by a probability measure, this paper generalizes Nash Equilibrium in nite extensive form games to allow for preferences conforming to the multiple priors model developed in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . The implications of this generalization for strategy choices and welfare are studied. Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: C72, D81.
INTRODUCTION
The subjective expected utility model axiomatized by S a v age (1954) has been the most popular model for studying decision making under uncertainty. In this model, the beliefs of a decision maker are represented by a probability measure. However, the descriptive v alidity of the model has been questioned since Ellsberg (1961) presented his famous example that people typically prefer to bet on drawing a red ball from an urn containing 50 red and black balls each, than from an urn containing 100 red and black balls in unknown proportions. 2 In fact, the pattern of preferences exhibited in Ellsberg's example is ruled out by a n y model of preferences in which underlying beliefs are represented by a probability measure. (Machina and Schmeidler (1992) call this property \probabilistic sophistication".)
Motivated by the Ellsberg Paradox, which demonstrates that there are situations where the information possessed by a decision maker about the states of nature is too \vague" or \ambiguous" to be representable by a probability measure, two important and closely related models have been developed. 3 Schmeidler (1989) develops the Choquet expected utility model, in which the beliefs of a decision maker are represented by a capacity or non-additive probability measure. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) develop the multiple priors model, in which the beliefs of a decision maker are represented by a set of additive probability measures. In the multiple priors model, a decision maker is said to be uncertainty a v erse if the set of probability measures representing his beliefs is not a singleton.
Although the Ellsberg Paradox only involves a single decision maker facing an exogenously specied environment, it is natural to think that uncertainty a v ersion is also common in decision making problems where more than one person is involved. Since existing equilibrium notions of games are dened under the assumption that players are subjective expected utility maximizers, deviations from the Savage model to accommodate aversion to uncertainty make it necessary to redene equilibrium concepts. This line of research has already started. For normal form games of complete information, Dow and Werlang (1994) , Klibano (1993) and Lo (1995a,b) generalize Nash Equilibrium; and Epstein (1995) generalizes rationalizibility and a p osteriori equilibrium. For normal form games of incomplete information, Epstein and Wang (1994) establish the general theoretical justication for the Harsanyi style formulation for non-Bayesian players. All the above papers either adopt the multiple priors model or consider a class of preferences which includes both 2 Variations of the Ellsberg Paradox h a v e been conrmed by many experimental studies. See Camerer and Weber (1992) for a survey.
3 See Camerer and Weber (1992) for a survey of other models.
the Choquet expected utility and multiple priors models as special cases. However, serious study on extensive form games with uncertainty a v erse players has not yet been carried out.
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept, Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, that generalizes Nash Equilibrium in extensive form games to accommodate preferences conforming to the multiple priors model. This research is important because many games of economic interest are extensive form games. The generalization creates a framework that enables us to study the eects of uncertainty a v ersion on strategic interaction in situations which are dynamic in nature.
It is well known that when players are expected utility maximizers, the denition of Nash Equilibrium in normal form games can be directly applied to (the normal form representation of the) extensive form games. Therefore, as far as Nash Equilibrium is concerned, a separate treatment for extensive form games is not needed. However, a separate treatment is required in the present setting of uncertainty a v erse players. The main reason is as follows. In an extensive form game, a strategy of a player is a specication of action taken by the player at every information set at which he is supposed to move. For an expected utility maximizing player, a strategy which maximizes his utility at the beginning of the game (that is, before anyone has made any m o v e) will continue to be optimal for him when he arrives at an information set that does not contradict his initial beliefs on his opponents' strategy choices. This property does not hold when player's beliefs are represented by a set of probability measures. Therefore, it is required to ensure that the strategy chosen in equilibrium by an uncertainty a v erse player be optimal, not necessarily at the beginning of the game, but rather at every information set that he thinks he will possibly reach when he carries out the strategy. Unlike Nash Equilibrium, Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium is an extensive form solution concept. That is, two extensive form games with the same normal form can have dierent sets of Multiple Priors Nash Equilibria. In the concluding section, I point out that dependence on the extensive form is natural when players are uncertainty a v erse. All other features of Nash Equilibrium are essentially preserved by the generalization. Therefore, a comparison between the two equilibrium concepts constitutes a ceteris paribus study of the eects of uncertainty a v ersion on extensive form games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of the multiple priors model, a discussion of how it is extended to the sequential choice setting and nally, a review of the denition of extensive form games. Section 3 denes Nash Equilibrium and its generalization. Section 4 makes use of the generalized equilibrium concept to illustrate how uncertainty a v ersion aects players' strategy choices and welfare. Some concluding remarks are oered in section 5.
PRELIMINARIES

Static Choice
In this section, I provide a brief review of the multiple priors model and a discussion of some of its properties that will be relevant in later sections.
For any topological space Y , adopt the Borel -algebra Y and denote by M(Y ) the set of all probability measures over Y with nite supports. Let (X; X ) be the space of outcomes and (; ) the space of uncertainty. F or the purpose of this paper, assume that is a nite set. Let F be the set of all functions from to M(X). That is, F is the set of two-stage, horse-race/roulette-wheel acts, as in Anscombe and Aumann (1963) . f is called a constant act if f(!) = p8 ! 2 ; such a n act involves (probabilistic) risk but no uncertainty. F or notational simplicity, I also use p 2 M(X) to denote the constant act that yields p in every state of the world, x 2 X the degenerate probability distribution on x and ! 2 the event f!g 2 . F or f;g 2 F and 2 [0; 1], f + ( 1 ) g h where h(!) = f(!) + ( 1 ) g ( ! )8 ! 2 . The primitive i s a w eak preference ordering over acts. The relations of strict preference and indierence are denoted by and respectively. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) impose a set of axioms on that are necessary and sucient for to be represented by a n umerical function having the following structure: there exists an ane function u : M(X) ! R and a unique, nonempty, closed and convex set 4 of probability measures on such that for all f;f 0 2 F , f f 0 , min p24 Z u fd pmin p24 Z u f 0 dp:
It is convenient, but in no way essential, to interpret 4 as \representing the beliefs underlying "; I provide no formal justication for such a n i n terpretation. According to the multiple priors model, preferences over constant acts, that can be identied with objective lotteries over X, are represented by u() and thus conform with the von Neumann Morgenstern model. The preference ordering over the set of all horse race/roulette wheel acts is quasiconcave. That is, for any t w o acts f;g2 F with f g, w e h a v e f + ( 1 ) g f for any 2 (0; 1).
There are three issues regarding the multiple priors model that will be relevant when the model is applied to games. The rst concerns the notion of null event. Given any preference ordering over acts, dene an event T t o b e -null as in Savage (1954) : T is -null if for any acts f;f 0 ; g ,
In words, an event T is -null if the decision maker does not care about payos in states belonging to T. This can be interpreted as the decision maker knows (or believes) that T can never happen. If is expected utility preferences, then T is -null if and only if the decision maker attaches zero probability t o T . I f is represented by the multiple priors model, then T is -null if and only if every probability measure in 4 attaches zero probability t o T .
The second concerns the notion of strict monotonicity. Given any preference ordering over acts, say that is strictly monotonic in an event T if for any t w o acts f and f 0 , f(!) f 0 (!) 8! 6 2 T and f(!) f 0 (!) 8! 2 T =) f f 0 : If is expected utility preferences, then it is strictly monotonic in T if and only if the decision maker attaches positive probability t o T . Therefore expected utility preferences are strictly monotonic in all non--null events. If is represented by the multiple priors model, then it is strictly monotonic in T if and only if every probability measure in 4 attaches positive probability t o T . In this paper, I impose the requirement that preferences which are represented by the multiple priors model be strictly monotonic in all non--null events. That is, every probability measure in 4 has the same support.
Finally, the notion of stochastic independence will also be relevant. Suppose the set of states is a product space 1 : : : n . In the case of a subjective expected utility maximizer, where beliefs are represented by a probability measure p 2 M(), beliefs are said to be stochastically independent if p is a product measure: p = n i=1 marg i p where marg i p is the marginal probability measure of p on i . In the case of uncertainty a v ersion, the decision maker's beliefs over are represented by a closed and convex set of probability measures 4. Let marg i 4 be the set of marginal probability measures on i as one varies over all the probability measures in 4. That is, marg i 4 f p i 2 M ( i ) j 9 p 2 4 such that p i = marg i pg:
Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989, p.150-151) , say that the decision maker's beliefs are stochastically independent if 4 = closed convex hull of f n i=1 p i j p i 2 marg i 4 8ig:
That is, 4 is the smallest closed convex set containing all the product measures in n i=1 marg i 4.
Sequential Choice
The multiple priors model described in section 2.1 is a model of static or \one-shot" choice. It has to be extended if we w ant to use it to deal with sequential choice problems.
Think of two \times" t = 0 and t = 1 at which c hoices are made. There is complete resolution of uncertainty at time t = 2. Suppose that at time t = 0, the preference ordering over the set of acts F mapping to M(X) is represented by the multiple priors model dened in (1). At time t = 1, suppose the decision maker learns that the true state is in a non--null event T . The relevant primitives now include: the set of states (T; T ), the set of outcomes X (unchanged) and the set of acts F T on T. Assume that acts in F T are ranked by a preference ordering T which i s represented by the following utility function: there exists a unique, nonempty, closed and convex set 4 T of probability measures on T such that for all f;f 0 2 F T ,
There remains the issue of the relationship between 4 and 4 T . A natural procedure to revise the beliefs of the decision maker is to rule out some of the priors in 4 and then update the rest according to Bayes rule. Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) , an updating rule is characterized by a function R of the form (4; T ) 7 ! R(4; T ) for every nonempty, closed and convex 4 M () and for every non--null T 2 such that R(4; T ) 4 is a nonempty, closed and convex set of measures with p(T) > 0 for all p 2 R(4; T ). The beliefs of the decision maker over T are then represented by the set of probability measures 4 T f q 2 M ( T ) j 9 p 2 R ( 4 ; T ) such that q is updated from p using Bayes ruleg:
An updating rule of particular interest is the maximum likelihood u p dating rule:
R(4; T ) = f p 2 4 j p ( T ) = max p24p (T)g: Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) provide an axiomatization of this updating rule. They show that if can be simultaneously represented by the Choquet expected utility and multiple priors models, the maximum likelihood updating rule coincides with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule (see Shafer (1976) ). Moreover the updating rule is commutative in the sense that the results of this rule are independent of the order in which information is gathered (see their Theorem 3.3). In this paper, I assume that 4 T is derived from 4 using the maximum likelihood updating rule. However, note that only Proposition 2 depends on what updating rule is adopted.
Unfortunately, when T is updated from as above, preferences do not satisfy the following dynamic consistency requirement unless 4 is a singleton: for all T 2 and for all f;f 0 2 F T , g 2 F n T ,
Suppose that at time t = 0, the act f(!) if ! 2 T g(!) if ! 6 2 T is chosen out of some feasible set. If (4) is not satised, choice made at t = 0 m a y not be respected at t = 1 . H o w ever, note the following two remarks.
First, violation of dynamic consistency is not specic to this updating rule. Epstein and Le Breton (1993) show that there does not exist T which is represented by (3) such that and T satisfy (4).
Second, note that the above dynamic consistency condition on preferences is strong in the sense that (4) is required to hold for all events T and for all acts f;f 0 and g. When an uncertainty averse decision maker is confronted with a particular sequential decision problem where there are only some acts available for choice at t = 0 and t = 1 respectively and only some events will possibly be realized at t = 1, it is possible that there may exist an act which is \dynamically consistent" in the sense that it is optimal for him to implement a t e v ery decision point which h e thinks that he will possibly reach as he carries out the act. Consider the game in Figure 1 . (For all the game trees presented in this paper, the vector of numbers at each terminal history refers to the utility p a y os to the players (player 1 rst, player 2 second, etc.) and the notation I ij refers to the jth information set of player i.)
Insert Figure 1 here At I 11 , player 1 is uncertain about which strategy player 2 is going to use. The space of uncertainty for player 1 can therefore be regarded as fL; M; Rg. Suppose player 1 is uncertainty a v erse with beliefs represented by the set of probability measures
Given the beliefs of player 1, the utility o f a n y strategy which i n v olves playing k at I 11 is equal to 30 while the utility o f a n y strategy which i n v olves playing r at I 11 is less than 30. Therefore at I 11 , it is optimal for him to use a strategy which i n v olves playing k at I 11 . Although the set of probability measures B 1 is not a singleton, such a strategy is \dynamically consistent". After player 1 plays k at I 11 , it will exclude the possibility of reaching the other two information sets I 12 and I 13 . He simply does not have a c hance to deviate from his original plan. See later sections for less extreme examples in which players actually move more than once.
Extensive F orm Games
In this section, I dene nite extensive form games of perfect recall. Formally, I need the following notation which is adapted from Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p.200 ). An extensive form game has the following components: N = f 1 ; : : : ; N gis the set of players.
H is the set of histories with typical element h. h is a sequence of actions taken by the players. The empty sequence is an element o f H . I f h = ( a k ) k =1;:::;K 2 H and K 0 < K , then (a k ) k=1;:::;K 0 2 H. The latter is called a subhistory of the former. (a k ) k=1;:::;K is terminal if there is no a K+1 such that (a k ) k=1;:::;K+1 2 H. The set of all terminal histories is denoted Z. The set of actions available after a non-terminal history h is denoted A(h) = f a : ( h; a) 2 Hg. P is a function which assigns to each non-terminal history a member of N. That is, P(h) i s the player who is going to move after the history h. I i is a partition of fh 2 HnZ j P ( h ) = i g with typical element I i . That is, I i is the collection of information sets for player i. It is required that for every I i 2 I i , A ( h ) = A ( h 0 ) for all h; h 0 2 I i . Therefore we can dene A(I i ) A(h) for any h 2 I i . That is, A(I i ) is the set of actions available to player i at his information set I i . u i : Z ! R is the payo function of player i.
An extensive form game G is a tuple fN ; H ; P ; fI i g i2N ; fu i g i2N g. 4 It is assumed that G is common knowledge among the players. Player i's strategy space is S i I i 2I i A(I i ) with typical element s i . That is, s i is a function that assigns the action s i (I i ) to each information set I i 2 I i . Dene s i (h) s i (I i ) 8h 2 I i 8I i 2 I i .
Given any history h = ( a 1 ; : : : ; a l ; a l +1 ; : : : ; a K ), s i is consistent with h if for every subhistory (a 1 ; : : : ; a l ) o f h for which P(a 1 ; : : : ; a l ) = i , w e h a v e s i ( a 1 ; : : : ; a l ) = a l +1 . s i is consistent with an information set if there exists a history h in the information set such that s i is consistent with h.
Throughout the paper, any statement concerning players i, j and k is intended for i = 1 ; : : : ; N and i 6 = j 6 = k.
EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS
Nash Equilibrium
The denition of Nash Equilibrium is well known; one version is stated in Denition 1 below. The main body of this section is to present Nash Equilibrium in a form that can be readily extended for our purposes. This is intended to convince the reader that the generalization undertaken in section 3.2 is appropriate.
Before anyone has made a move, player i is uncertain about the strategy choices of other players. Therefore S i j 6 = i S j can be regarded as the state space for player i. Each strategy s i 2 S i of player i can be regarded as an act over this state space. If player i plays s i and the other players play s i 2 S i , i receives the utility outcome u i (s i ; s i ) u i ( z ) where z is the unique terminal history such that every element i n ( s i ; s i ) is consistent with z. According to the subjective expected utility model, player i's beliefs over S i are represented by a probability measure b i . Nash Equilibrium can be stated as follows: Denition 1. fb i g N i=1 is a Nash Equilibrium if the following conditions are satised. The interpretation of Denition 1 is as follows. Condition 1 is a restriction on players' initial beliefs. It can be broken into three parts:
(ii) b i = j6 =i marg S j b i and (iii) marg S j b i = I j 2I j (I j ).
(i) says that the marginal beliefs of players i and j on the strategy choice of player k agree. (ii) says that the beliefs of player i about the strategy choices of all the other players are stochastically independent. (iii) says that the beliefs of player i about the moves of player j at all of j's information sets are stochastically independent. The expression P s i 2S i u i (s i ; s i ) b i ( s i ) in condition 2 is player i's ex ante utility of the strategy s i given his beliefs b i . That is, it is player i's utility o f c hoosing the strategy s i before any one has made any m o v e. Therefore in a Nash Equilibrium fb i g N i=1 , e v ery strategy s i in i (which is the support of marg S i b j ) maximizes the ex ante utility of player i. That is, player j knows (in the sense dened in section 2.1) that player i will pick a strategy to maximize ex ante utility.
However, the most important property for fb i g N i=1 to be an equilibrium, which is not explicit in Denition 1, is that every strategy s i 2 i is optimal for player i to implement a t e v ery history that he thinks (according to his initial beliefs b i ) he will possibly reach when he carries out s i . I f this property w ere not satised, a strategy that is optimal and chosen by player i before anyone has made any m o v e, may not be implemented by player i as the players proceed to play the game.
The above suggests a reformulation of Nash Equilibrium in terms of the interim utility of players; that is, the utility of each player at points where he has to take an action. Condition 1 in Denition 2 is the same as that in Denition 1. The interpretation of condition 2 is as follows. As the players proceed to play the game, every strategy s i 2 i of player i must be a best response for player i (according to his interim utility) at every information set I i that can be reached by a strategy prole in s i i . Call a strategy having this property dynamically consistent. Since i is the support of marg S i b j which in turn represents the marginal beliefs of player j on i's strategy choice, player j knows that player i will choose a dynamically consistent strategy.
It is well known that Denitions 1 and 2 are equivalent due to the fact that expected utility preferences are dynamically consistent. Since Denition 1 is much easier to state, it is the more common formulation of Nash Equilibrium. As pointed out in section 2.2, preferences which are representable by the multiple priors model are not dynamically consistent. Therefore, the distinction between ex ante and interim utility maximization is important for the generalization pursued here.
Generalization of Nash Equilibrium
At the beginning of the game, player i is uncertain about the strategy choices of opponents. Since player i is uncertainty a v erse, beliefs over S i are represented by a closed and convex set of probability measures B i . Assume that the probability measures in B i have the same support i S i . This ensures that the preference ordering of player i is strictly monotonic in every non-null event. I i (s i ; i ) and i (I i 
The following is a generalization of Nash Equilibrium:
Denition 3. fB i g N i=1 is a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium if the following conditions are satised. (ii) and (iii) require the beliefs of the players to be stochastically independent (in the sense dened in the last paragraph of section 2.1). Condition 2 in Denition 3 only diers from that in Denition 2 by allowing players' utility functions to be represented by the multiple priors model. Any Nash Equilibrium is also a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium. Therefore existence of the latter is ensured.
DOES UNCERTAINTY AVERSION MATTER?
Questions
In section 3, I have developed an equilibrium concept to study the eects of uncertainty a v ersion in the context of extensive form games. My objective here is to address the following two specic questions: Note that in the above w elfare comparison, I am xing the utility function of lotteries u. This assumption can be claried by the following restatement: assume that the decision maker has a xed preference ordering over M(X) which satises the independence axiom and is represented numerically by u. Denote by and 0 the orderings over acts corresponding to the priorsp and 4 respectively. Then the above w elfare comparison presumes that both and 0 agree with on the set of constant acts, that is, for any f;g 2 F with f(!) = p and g(!) = q for all ! 2 , f g , f 0 g , p q.
In section 4.2, I rst examine the above questions in the context of normal form games (or extensive form games where players do not learn anything about the strategy choices of opponents when the game is played.) In section 4.3, I address the questions in the context of \proper" extensive form games. Various examples are constructed to demonstrate that uncertainty a v ersion leads to new predictions and enhances players' welfare. On the other hand, I identify two specic classes of games for which the answers are opposite.
Normal Form Games
Say that G is a normal form game if for every terminal history z and every information set I i in G, there exists a subhistory h of z such that h 2 I i . That is, when player i arrives at the information set I i , he does not learn anything about the strategy choices of his opponents. When G is a normal form game, there is no updating of beliefs. Condition 2 in the denition of Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium collapses to the following normal form restriction which parallels that in Denition 1: This normal form solution concept diers from those in Klibano (1993) and Lo (1995a) . In particular, it is a strengthening of those in Dow and Werlang (1994) and Lo (1995b) by imposing the condition that the probability measures in B i have the same support. Therefore I pause to examine its properties. 6 6 See Lo (1995a) for a detailed comparison of the solution concepts in Dow and Werlang (1994) , Klibano (1993) and Lo (1995a) .
Consider the following question in the context of single person decision making. As an outside observer, can we distinguish an uncertainty a v erse decision maker from a Bayesian decision maker? Under the following circumstance, the answer is \no". Suppose that we observe an uncertainty averse decision maker who chooses an act f from a constraint set G = ff;gg that contains only two elements. Then his choice can always be rationalized (as long as monotonicity is not violated) by a subjective expected utility function. For example, take the simple case where the state space = f! 1 ; ! 2 g . The feasible set of utility p a y os f(u(f(! 1 )); u ( f ( ! 2 ))); (u(g(! 1 )); u ( g ( ! 2 )))g generated by the constraint set ff;gg are simply two points in R 2 . To rationalize his choice by an expected utility function, we can draw a linear indierence curve which passes through (u(f(! 1 )); u ( f ( ! 2 ))) and (lies above) (u(g(! 1 )); u ( g ( ! 2 ))), with slope describing the probabilistically sophisticated beliefs of the decision maker. This argument immediately leads us to Proposition 1. Given a 22 normal form game, if fB i ; B j g is a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, then there exist b i 2 B i and b j 2 B j such that fb i ; b j gis a Nash Equilibrium.
Proposition 1 delivers two messages. The rst regards the prediction of how the game will be played. Suppose fB i ; B j gis a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium of a 2 2 game. Recall that every probability measure in B j has the same support i . The prediction associated with the equilibrium regarding strategies played is that i chooses some s i 2 i . According to Proposition 1, it is always possible to nd at least one Nash Equilibrium fb i ; b j gsuch that the support of b j is also i . Therefore the observed behavior of the uncertainty a v erse players (the actual strategies they choose) is also consistent with utility maximization given beliefs represented by fb i ; b j g . This implies that an outsider who can only observe the actual strategy choice in the single game under study will not be able to distinguish uncertainty a v erse players from Bayesian players.
The second message regards the welfare of the players. The fact that the Nash Equilibrium is The left hand side of the above inequality is the utility of player i in the Nash Equilibrium and the right hand side is that in the Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium. In terms of certainty equivalent, the Nash Equilibrium Pareto dominates the Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium. The game of matching pennies shows that the above inequality can be strict. The utility of the players in the Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium is 1 and that in the Nash Equilibrium is 5.
The game below shows that Proposition 1 does not extend to two person normal form games where players have more that two strategies. 8 It also shows that uncertainty a v ersion can make both players strictly better o. In this Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, player i believes that player j will play R and therefore both C and D are i's best responses. Player j does not know whether player i will play C or D. Since player j is uncertainty a v erse, he prefers to play R which ensures him the payo of 4. As a result, player i receives 1 billion and player j receives 4 with certainty. Therefore the Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium strongly Pareto dominates (both ex ante and ex post) the unique Nash Equilibrium of this game.
Extensive F orm Games
The game in Figure 2 shows that uncertainty a v ersion in extensive form games can also lead to Pareto improvement.
Insert Figure 2 here
If playe r 2 i s a B a y esian, his beliefs about what player 1 is going to do at the information set I 12 are represented by a probability measure. The utility of the strategy k (m) is strictly higher than that of r if player 2 attaches probability of at least 0.5 that player 1 will take the action L (R) a t the information set I 12 . Therefore player 2 will never play r. This implies that if player 1 plays D, his payo is equal to 0 with certainty. Therefore any solution concept which assumes that player 1 knows that player 2 is a Bayesian will predict that player 1 plays U and the payo to each player is equal to 1 with certainty. The following constitutes a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium of the game: 9 B(I 11 ) = D; B(I 12 ) = f 2 M ( f L; Rg) j 0:1 (L) 0:9g; B(I 21 ) = r :
In this equilibrium, player 2's beliefs about what player 1 is going to do at the information set I 12 are represented by a set of probability measures B(I 12 ). It predicts that player 1 plays D at I 11 and player 2 plays r at I 21 . Player 1 gets 1 billion with certainty and player 2 gets 1000 with certainty. Therefore, the Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium strongly Pareto dominates (both ex ante and ex post) a n y Nash Equilibrium of this game. To see why uncertainty a v ersion leads to a better equilibrium, note that the probability measures in B(I 12 ) that minimize player 2's utility of playing k and m are dierent. The probability measure that minimizes the utility o f k is (L; 0:1; R; 0:9) and the one that minimizes the utility o f m is (L; 0:9; R; 0:1). This makes playing k and m undesirable for player 2. On the other hand, if playe r 2 i s a B a y esian, the two probability measures have t o coincide. As a result, either k or m is strictly better than r.
Next consider the slightly modied game in In this Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, player 2 is uncertainty a v erse about what playe r 1 i s going to do at both the information sets I 12 and I 13 . This discourages playe r 2 t o p l a y either k or m. The equilibrium predicts that player 1 plays D at I 11 and player 2 plays r at I 21 . H o w ever, we can also construct a Nash Equilibrium to support the above prediction. For example, (I 11 ) = D; (I 12 ) = ( L; 0:1; R; 0:9); ( I 13 ) = ( L; 0:9; R; 0:1); ( I 21 ) = r is such a Nash Equilibrium. Moreover, the two equilibria yield the same utility and therefore certainty equivalent to playe r 1 a t I 11 and playe r 2 a t I 21 .
In the Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium constructed for the game in Figure 3 , each player only moves once. The equilibrium constructed for the game in Figure 4 suggests that the above phenomenon of observational and welfare equivalence holds more generally.
Insert Figure 4 here
The following constitutes a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium of the game in Figure 4: B(I 11 ) = e; B(I 12 ) = q; B(I 21 ) = f 2 M ( f g;hg)j0:1(g)0:9g; B(I 22 ) = f 2 M ( f t; ug) j 0:1 (t) 0:9g:
In this equilibrium, player 1 will take the action e at I 11 , playe r 2 m a y take either g or h at I 21 . I f player 2 takes g, player 1 will take the action q at I 12 . Therefore player 1 has the chance to move twice. Nevertheless, we can also construct a Nash Equilibrium that supports the above predictions and yields the same welfare to the players at every information set that is possibly reached. For example, (I 11 ) = e; (I 12 ) = q; (I 21 ) = ( g;0:1; h; 0:9); ( I 22 ) = ( t; 0:1; u; 0:9)
is such a Nash Equilibrium.
The messages conveyed by the games in Figures 3 and 4 can be clearly illustrated in the context of single person decision theory. First consider the following static choice scenario: suppose a decision maker is facing a state space = 1 : : : n .His preference ordering over acts dened on is represented by the multiple priors model dened in (1). Suppose that he is allowed to choose an act from ff 1 ; : : : ; f n gwhere the payo of f i only depends on i for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n . In what follows, f i will also be identied in the obvious way as an act dened on i . In this case, restricted to ff 1 ; : : : ; f n g can be represented by the expected utility function R ufd (p 1 : : : p n ) wherep i 2 argmin p i 2marg i 4 Z i u f i dp i 8i = 1 ; : : : ; n : (6) Moreover, R u f i d(p 1 : : : p n ) = min p24 R u f i dp for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n .
The above argument immediately translates to the game in Figure 3 if we set the decision maker to be playe r 2 a t I 21 , = 1 2 3 , 1 = A ( I 12 ), 2 = A(I 13 ), 3 a singleton, f 1 = k, f 2 = m, f 3 = r, p 1 = ( L; 0:1; R; 0:9) andp 2 = ( L; 0:9; R; 0:1).
Next, consider the following sequential choice scenario: think of two \times" at which c hoices are made. Suppose at time t = 0, the decision maker is facing the state space = 0 1 : : : n . Again, over acts dened on is represented by the multiple priors model dened in (1) where the associated set of probability measures 4 takes the form of (2). Let T = ! 0 1 : : : n with ! 0 2 0 be a non--null event. Recall that T is represented by the multiple priors model dened in (3), where the associated set of probability measures 4 T is derived from 4 using the maximum likelihood updating rule. Given an act f dened on , f T [f(!) if ! 2 T] denotes the induced act dened on T, and similarly for f nT . Let ff 1 ; : : : ; f n ; c gbe a set of acts dened on with the following properties:
1. The payo of f i T only depends on i and that of f i nT only depends on 0 n! 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n .
2. f i nT = f j nT for all i; j = 1 ; : : : ; n . 3. c is a constant act. 1 implies that f i T can be identied as an act dened on i and f i nT an act dened on 0 n! 0 . 2 implies that for all p 0 2 M( 0 ) and for all i; j = 1 ; : : : ; n , R 0 n ! 0 u f i n T dp 0 = R 0 n! 0 u f j nT dp 0 . In this particular setting, it is easy to verify that for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n , min p24 Z u f i dp = u f i nT dp 0 ]: The decision problem is specied as follows: at time t = 0, the decision maker has the option of choosing an act from ff 1 ; : : : ; f n ; c g . If the decision maker chooses c, then the decision problem is over. On the other hand, if the decision maker chooses any f i , then at time t = 1, he will be told whether the true state is in T. I f T does not happen, the decision problem is over. If T happens, he can switch t o a n y act in ff 1 ; : : : ; f n g . The question is: suppose we observe that the decision maker chooses, for instance, f 2 at t = 0 and t = 1. Can this choice be rationalized as expected utility maximizing behavior? To see that the answer is \yes", rst go to t = 1. Observe that if T happens, the discussion of the static choice scenario in the previous paragraph is applicable. As in T dp i + Z 0 n! 0 u f i nT dp 0 ]:
The expected utility functions The relevance of this observation to the game in Figure 4 is as follows. Set the decision maker to be player 1, = 0 1 2 , 0 = A ( I 21 ), 1 = A(I 22 ), 2 a singleton, ! 0 = g, f 1 to be the strategy fs(I 11 ) = e; s(I 12 ) = r g , f 2 the strategy fs(I 11 ) = e; s(I 12 ) = q g and c any strategy which involves taking the action d at I 11 . A t t = 0, playe r 1 i s a t I 11 and facing the state space . If he picks the strategy c, the game is over. On the other hand, if he picks f 1 or f 2 , then at t = 1 , if the true state is in T, he will nd himself at I 12 . Given the Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, construct the Nash Equilibrium in the following manner: rst go to t = 1 . According to (6), (t; 0:1; u; 0:9) is the probability measure in B(I 22 ) which minimizes player 1's utility o f p l a ying f 1 and rationalizes that f 2 is strictly better than f 1 . Then go to t = 0. According to (7), (g;0:1; h; 0:9) is the probability measure in B(I 21 ) which minimizes player 1's utility of playing f 2 .
The above i n tuition leads to Proposition 2. Given a two person game of perfect information, if fB i ; B j gis a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, then there exist b i 2 B i and b j 2 B j such that fb i ; b j gis a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof: See the appendix.
Same as Proposition 1, Proposition 2 delivers the message that in two person games of perfect information, uncertainty a v erse players are not observationally distinguishable from Bayesian players.
With regard to player's welfare, the Nash Equilibrium constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 has the following property: the value function of player i (at every history h such that P(h) = i and there exists a strategy in j which is consistent with h) in the Nash Equilibrium is the same as that in the Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium. This implies that for any Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, we can nd a Nash Equilibrium that not only delivers the same predictions, but also yields the same interim utility and therefore certainty equivalent to each player.
Finally, the game in Figure 5 demonstrates that Proposition 2 does not extend to games of perfect information where more than two players are involved. This is due to the extra requirement imposed by the equilibrium concept that in a game with more than two players, the marginal beliefs of the players have to agree. Note that in this Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, although the marginal beliefs of players 2 and 3 about what player 1 is going to do at the information set I 12 are represented by the same set of probability measures B(I 12 ), the probability measure in B(I 12 ) that minimizes the utility of the strategy L for playe r 2 i s ( a; 0:2; b; 0:8); the one that minimizes the utility of the strategy k for playe r 3 i s ( a; 0:5; b; 0:5). In this Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, player 1 plays U at I 11 and playe r 2 m a y play either R or L at I 21 . H o w ever, the observation that player 1 plays U at I 11 and player 2 plays R at I 21 is incompatible with any Nash Equilibrium. To demonstrate this, note that player 1 will play U at I 11 only if L is a best response for player 2 and r is a best response for player 3. R is a best response for player 2 only if k is a best response for player 3. Therefore we need to construct a Nash Equilibrium in which both k and r are best responses for player 3. This is true only if the probability that player 1 will play a at I 12 is equal to 0.5. However it implies that R is not a best response for player 2.
CONCLUDING REMARKS 5.1 Renements
This paper provides a generalization of Nash Equilibrium in extensive form games that allows preferences of players to be represented by the multiple priors model. One area of future research i s to provide renements of the equilibrium concept. One renement that can be readily formulated is subgame perfection: require (in the same way as for a Nash Equilibrium) the restriction of a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium fB(I i )g I i 2I i ;i=1;:::;N of a game to any of its subgame to be a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium of that subgame. Note that all the Multiple Priors Nash Equilibria constructed in the examples of this paper are subgame perfect.
Normal vs. Extensive F orm Solution Concepts
Unlike Nash Equilibrium, Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium is an extensive form solution concept. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) popularize the view that a solution concept should only depend on the reduced normal form of a game. An implicit assumption underlying their arguments is that players' preferences are represented by the expected utility model. Another area of research i s t o re-examine the validity of this view if we allow players' preferences to deviate from the expected utility model. For instance, consider the two games in Figures 6 and 7 which are \extensive form" versions of the Ellsberg Paradox.
Insert Figures 6 and 7 here
Suppose player 2 knows that player 1 draws a ball randomly from an urn which contains one red ball and two black and yellow balls in unknown proportions. Note that the two games have the same (reduced) normal form. Will player 2 play the two games in exactly the same way? In Figure 6 , player 2 does not receive a n y information about the random draw. The Ellsberg Paradox suggests that if player 2 is uncertainty a v erse, he will strictly prefer to play L. In Figure 7 , when player 2 is given the chance to move, he knows that the ball drawn out is not yellow. This piece of information may make him strictly prefer to play R. F or instance, suppose that the initial beliefs of player 2 are represented by the set of probability measures fp 2 M(fR; B; Y g) j p(R) = 1 3 ; 1 6 p ( B ) 3 6 g . This predicts that player 2 will strictly prefer to play L in the game in Figure 6 . Applying the maximum likelihood updating rule, his beliefs after receiving the information that the ball drawn out is not yellow are represented by the probability measure (R; 2 5 ; B; 3 5 ). This predicts that player 2 will strictly prefer to play R in the game in Figure 7 . Therefore uncertainty a v ersion suggests the non-equivalence between the two extensive form games.
Choice of Strategy Space
Recall from section 2.1 that preferences represented by the multiple priors model are quasiconcave. This implies that the decision maker may h a v e a strict incentive to randomize among acts. However, the possibility of randomization was not considered in extensive form games with uncertainty a v erse players in section 3.2. It is therefore necessary to provide a clarication.
In the context of normal form games, Lo (1995a) claries the argument for and against the assumption that uncertainty a v erse players have a strict incentive to randomize. The argument goes as follows: The use of pure vs. mixed strategy spaces depends on the perception of the players about the order of strategy choices. The adoption of a mixed strategy space can be justied by the assumption that each player is dynamically consistent in the sense of Machina (1989) and perceives himself as moving last. On the other hand, we can understand the adoption of a pure strategy space as assuming that each player perceives himself as moving rst.
In extensive form games, it is reasonable to assume that the perception of the players on the order of strategy choices agree with the order of moves which are explicitly specied by the game tree. For instance, if the game tree explicitly species that playe r 1 m o v es rst and playe r 2 m o v es second. When player 1 decides what strategy to play, it is natural that player 1 perceives himself as the rst person to make the strategy choice and therefore he will not have a strict incentive t o randomize. This explains the choice of pure strategy space in this paper.
Behavioral Consistency
Finally, note that there is an alternative approach, termed behavioral consistency, that has been used to study extensive form games where players' preferences are not dynamically consistent (see, for example, Karni and Safra (1989) ). This approach treats the same player i at each information set I i as a distinct agent. The pure strategy space of agent I i is therefore A(I i ). Each agent I i of the same player i has the same payo at the terminal histories but he is only interested in choosing a strategy in A(I i ) to maximize his own utility. Therefore the original game of N players is analyzed as a game of P N i=1 #I i agents. This approach also prevents a player from choosing a strategy that he knows will not be implemented. However it has the disadvantage that the equilibrium notion does not collapse to Nash Equilibrium when players are expected utility maximizers; see, for example, Myerson (1991, p.161) . Since the purpose of my paper is to generalize Nash Equilibrium to accommodate uncertainty a v ersion, the behavioral consistency approach is not adopted here.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2. In a game of perfect information, every information set is a singleton. Therefore h will be used to denote both the history h and the information set that contains h. Suppose fB i ; B j gis a Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium. Recall that j denotes the support of every probability measure in B i . F or every history h such that P(h) = i and there exists a strategy in j which is consistent with h, dene V i (h) max 
where C i (h) S i is the set of strategies of player i that is consistent with h. That is, V i (h) is the value function of player i at h. Suppose player i nds himself at h. The objective of player i is to pick a strategy s i 2 C i (h) such that the interim utility o f s i is equal to V i (h).
Since coalescing of moves does not aect the set of Multiple Priors Nash Equilibrium, there is no loss of generality b y assuming that the extensive form game satises the following property: if P(h) = i , then there does not exist an action a such that (h; a) is non-terminal and P((h; a)) = i.
For every terminal history z, dene V i (z) u i (z). Suppose player i at h plays s i 2 C i (h) with s i (h) = a . There are three possibilities: (i) If (h;â) is terminal, then player i receives V i (h;â). (ii) If P((h;â)) = j and player j plays s j 2 j such that it is consistent with (h;â), s j ((h;â)) = a and (h;â; a ) is terminal, then player i receives V i ((h;â; a )). (iii) If P((h;â)) = j and player j plays s j 2 j such that it is consistent with (h;â), s j ((h;â)) = a and P((h;â; a )) = i, then player i will nd himself at (h;â; a ) and he will have t o p i c k a strategy in C i ((h;â; if there exists a strategy in j which is consistent with h 0 any element i n B ( h 0 ) otherwise. The equivalence of (9) and (10) implies that every s i 2 i is optimal for player i to implement when player i's initial beliefs are represented by the probability measure b i . Since b j 2 B j , the support of b j is i . Therefore fb i ; b j gconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. 
